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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-2104 
____________ 
 
QUINCY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
                      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
IMPERIUM INSURANCE COMPANY 
f/k/a Delos Insurance Company 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-14-cv-00612) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jan E. DuBois 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 21, 2016 
 
Before:  FISHER, CHAGARES and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 29, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
                                                                                                                                       
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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In this insurance coverage case, appellant Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company sought a declaratory judgment that appellee Imperium Insurance 
Company was obliged to reimburse Quincy Mutual more than $1 million for its 
defense and indemnification of one its insureds, Sunrise Concrete, Inc. Quincy 
Mutual asserted that Imperium had primary liability coverage over the claims 
against Sunrise Concrete. The district court entered summary judgment in 
Imperium’s favor. We find that the district court correctly interpreted the insurance 
policies and the certificate of insurance and will affirm.  
I 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context 
and legal history of the case. Therefore, we set forth only those facts that are 
necessary to our analysis. 
Sunrise Concrete was the concrete contractor for a housing development 
construction project in Pottstown, Pennsylvania. Sunrise Concrete subcontracted 
some of the concrete work, including the construction of porches, to Cruzeiro 
Novo under an oral agreement. A construction worker, Zhe Feng Huang, was 
injured while working on a porch roof. Huang sued Sunrise Concrete and others 
for negligence in Pennsylvania state court.  
Sunrise Concrete’s general liability insurance carrier was Quincy Mutual, 
who defended Sunrise Concrete against the suit. Quincy Mutual added Cruzeiro 
Novo’s insurer, Imperium, as a defendant in the state-court litigation. Quincy 
Mutual asserted that Sunrise Concrete was an additional insured on Cruzeiro 
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Novo’s policy and that Imperium was therefore obligated to defend Sunrise 
Concrete.  
Before Sunrise Concrete permitted Cruzeiro Novo to perform work as its 
subcontractor, it sought assurance from Cruzeiro Novo that it was an additional 
insured on Cruzeiro Novo’s policy. Cruzeiro Novo produced a certificate of 
liability insurance that stated, “Sunrise Concrete Company Inc. is named as 
additional insured.”1 The certificate, however, bore this warning: “This certificate 
is issued as a matter of informatio [sic] only and confers no rights upon the 
certificate holder. This certificate does not amend, extend or alter the coverage 
afforded by the policies below.”2 The certificate of insurance was issued by 
Fairways Insurance Services, an agent of Imperium. 
At the time of Huang’s injury, Cruzeiro Novo’s insurance policy with 
Imperium contained a blanket additional insured endorsement: 
Insured includes any person or organization that you have 
agreed in a written contract or agreement to add as an 
additional insured on this policy, but only with respect to 
liability arising out of your work for such person or 
organization.3 
Because Cruzeiro Novo worked as Sunrise Concrete’s subcontractor under an oral 
agreement and not a written contract, Imperium asserted that Sunrise Concrete was 
not an insured under the additional insured endorsement. 
                                                                                                                                       
1. App. 159. 
2. Id. 
3. App. 254. 
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Quincy Mutual settled Huang’s suit against Sunrise Concrete for $1 million 
but reserved its rights against Imperium and filed this declaratory judgment action 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Quincy 
Mutual and Imperium filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district 
court granted Imperium’s motion and denied Quincy Mutual’s motion. 
II4 
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and apply 
the same standard as the district court.5 Summary judgment is appropriate when no 
material facts are genuinely disputed and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.6 
Quincy Mutual argues the district court erred by granting Imperium summary 
judgment for three reasons. One, the phrase “written contract or agreement” in 
Cruzeiro Novo’s policy with Imperium is ambiguous and must be construed 
against Imperium because it could mean “written contract or oral agreement.” 
Two, Imperium is bound by certificate of insurance issued by its authorized agent, 
Fairways Insurance Services. Three, Imperium is equitably estopped from denying 
insurance coverage because of the statement in the certificate of insurance that 
                                                                                                                                       
4. The district court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). We 
have appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s final decision under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
5.  Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011). 
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
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Sunrise Concrete was named an additional insured. We address each of these 
arguments in turn. 
A 
Quincy Mutual argues that summary judgment was improper because the 
blanket additional insured endorsement is ambiguous. We apply state law to 
contract disputes in diversity cases. There is some question whether Pennsylvania 
or New Jersey law applies in this case.7 The district court, with the concurrence of 
the parties, found that the interpretation of insurance contracts is “largely the 
same” under Pennsylvania and New Jersey law and that the result would be 
identical under the law of either state.8 For the sake of consistency, the district 
court applied Pennsylvania law in its analysis of the insurance policy. Neither 
party objected to this approach, and we will likewise apply Pennsylvania contract 
law. 
Under Pennsylvania law, courts interpret the meaning of insurance contracts 
by determining the intent of the parties as expressed by the policy language.9 If the 
language is unambiguous, the express terms of the contract are controlling.10 An 
                                                                                                                                       
7. Imperium issued its policy to Cruzeiro Novo, a New Jersey corporation, in 
New Jersey. The additional insured endorsement and certificate of insurance 
were issued by Fairways in New Jersey. The construction site where Huang 
was injured was in Pennsylvania. Huang sued in Pennsylvania, and Quincy 
Mutual sued Imperium in Pennsylvania. 
8. App. 7 n.6. 
9. Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 
1999). 
10. Id.  
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ambiguous policy term is construed against the insurer.11 A contractual provision is 
ambiguous if it can reasonably be understood to have more than one meaning.12 
But a court may not strain or distort the language to find an ambiguity where none 
exists.13 
Quincy Mutual argues that the term “written contract or agreement” is 
ambiguous because it could mean “written contract or (any written or oral) 
agreement” or “written contract or (written) agreement.” The first construction is 
conceivable,14 but the only reasonable interpretation is the second. In this phrase, 
“written” modifies both “contract” and “agreement.” To read it otherwise would 
render “written” meaningless.15 The district court correctly interpreted the 
contract. 
                                                                                                                                       
11. Id. 
12. Id.  
13. Id.   
14. See Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa. 1982) (“[S]carcely an 
agreement could be conceived that might not be unreasonably contrived into 
the appearance of ambiguity.”). 
15. Quincy Mutual cites a trio of New York cases that found “written contract or 
agreement” or similar terms ambiguous. Superior Ice Rink, Inc. v. Nescon 
Contracting Corp., 861 N.Y.S.2d 362, 365 (App. Div. 2008); Travelers 
Indem. Co. of Am. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 802 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (App. Div. 
2005); Bassuk Bros. v. Utica First Ins. Co., Nos. 15285/00, 75219/01, 2002 
WL 31925593, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 1, 2002). Like the district court, we 
find these decisions unpersuasive. Courts from a variety of jurisdictions agree 
with the conclusion that “written contract or agreement” unambiguously 
requires a written document. Palmer v. Martinez, 42 So. 3d 1147, 1154 (La. 
Ct. App. 2010) (“Although it is linguistically possible to read the target 
provision in such a way that the adjective ‘written’ modifies only ‘contract,’ 
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The parties agree that there was no written contract or agreement between 
Sunrise Concrete and Cruzeiro Novo. Under the express terms of the endorsement, 
Sunrise Concrete was not an additional insured and Imperium was not obligated to 
defend and indemnify it. 
B 
Quincy Mutual next argues that Imperium is bound by the certificate of 
insurance issued by Fairways, Imperium’s authorized agent.16 The certificate of 
insurance stated that Sunrise Concrete was an additional insured on Cruzeiro 
Novo’s policy with Imperium. Under Pennsylvania law, “an insurer is liable for 
the acts of an agent who had authority to bind coverage and had advised the 
policyholder that he had done so.”17  
                                                                                                                                       
that does not render such an interpretation reasonable.”); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Hartford Ins. Co., 726 N.E.2d 126, 129 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000) (“Plaintiffs’ 
construction [that ‘agreement’ may be interpreted to include either a written 
or oral agreement] leads to an absurd result.”); Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Red Fox 
Tavern, Inc., No. 92-CA-93, 1993 WL 360722, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 17, 
1993) (“[R]easonable persons could not conclude that by using the 
conjunctive ‘or,’ appellant provided coverage for liability assumed by a 
written contract or by any agreement, whether written or oral.”); Indem. Ins. 
Co. of N. Am. v. Pac. Clay Prods. Co., 91 Cal. Rptr. 452, 458 (Ct. App. 1970) 
(finding an interpretation permitting oral agreement “unreasonable and 
absurd”).  
16. Quincy Mutual confines this argument to a claim that Fairways had actual 
authority and makes no assertion that Fairways could bind Imperium through 
apparent or implied authority. 
17. Pressley v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 817 A.2d 1131, 1138 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2003).  
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Fairways did not have authority to add Sunrise Concrete as an additional 
insured through a certificate of insurance. The certificate of insurance specifically 
stated that it was for informational purposes only and did not modify the terms, 
exclusions, or conditions of the policy.18 The statement in the certificate of 
insurance that Sunrise Concrete was an additional insured was without effect. 
C 
Finally, Quincy Mutual argues that, even if Sunrise Concrete was not an 
additional insured under the policy endorsement or certificate of insurance, 
Imperium is estopped from denying coverage due to the statement in the certificate 
of insurance. Under both Pennsylvania and New Jersey law, to establish coverage 
by estoppel, the insured must have reasonably and detrimentally relied on a 
misstatement by the insurer that coverage existed.19 The district court correctly 
determined that no reasonable jury could find that Sunrise Concrete reasonably 
relied on the certificate of insurance. It is unreasonable to rely on a certificate of 
insurance that explicitly disclaims conferring any rights.20 
                                                                                                                                       
18. App. 159; see also 17 Lee R. Russ et al., Couch on Insurance § 242:33 (3d 
ed. 2005) (“Where an entity requires another to procure insurance naming it 
an additional insured, that party should not rely on a mere certificate of 
insurance, but should insist on a copy of the policy. A certificate of insurance 
is not part of the policy—if it states that there is coverage but the policy does 
not, the policy controls.”).  
19. McDonald v. Keystone Ins. Co., 459 A.2d 1292, 1295 (Pa. Super Ct. 1983); 
Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 A.2d 208, 219 (N.J. 1969). 
20. See Couch on Insurance § 242:33; see also Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 
S.W.3d 310, 314 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (“Given the numerous limitations 
and exclusions that often encumber such policies, those who take such 
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III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the district court. 
                                                                                                                                       
certificates at face value do so at their own risk.”); Ala. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. 
Bailey’s Constr. Co., 950 So. 2d 280, 286 (Ala. 2006) (finding reliance on 
certificate of insurance unreasonable as a matter of law); Greater N.Y. Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. White Knight Restoration, Ltd., 776 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (App. Div. 
2004) (finding, in context of a fraud claim, no reasonable reliance on 
certificates of insurance “in the face of their disclaimer language”). 
 
 
